The Nature of the DES Problem
An estimated one-half to two million women took DES between 1947, when the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved its use for prevention of accidents related to pregnancy, and 1971, when the FDA withdrew approval for use by pregnant women. As many as four million female offspring were exposed to DES [Henderson 1980, p. 143] . The FDA categorized DES as experimental and required it to be so labeled when distributed [Dworkin 1981b, p. 77] . Although DES was considered both safe and effective at the time of its introduction, medical researchers subsequently discovered that daughters of DES users had an unusually high incidence of precancerous condition and rare forms of cancer. Nor was DES shown to be effective for the prevention of miscarriages.
Somewhere between 94 and 300 companies produced DES during the 20 years prior to the discovery of the drug's adverse consequences [Sheiner 1978, p. 964] . No firm held a patent on DES because it was a generically marketed product, and pharmacists could fill prescriptions with the product of any manufacturer [Payton v. Abbott Labs 1979]. Many of these firms sold DES for uses other than, or in addition to, accidents of pregnancy. DES continues to be prescribed for a number of health-related problems.
The above factors combine to create unique problems for DES plaintiffs who seek recovery in product liability litigation. When more than 100 firms have marketed a product which may have caused injuries which become apparent only after 10 to 20 years following plaintiffs' prenatal exposure, there are difficult problems regarding proof of facts. More specifically, a plaintiff will encounter difficulty in attempting to identify, perhaps 25 years after her mother had consumed the product, which pharmaceutical firm manufactured the drug that caused her injuries.
All of these considerations relate to the issue of intra-industry joint liability: under what conditions may a plaintiff sue an entire industry, or the major members thereof, to assess liability for a defective product whose exact origin is unknown [Kroll 1979, p. 193 As with an assertion of alternative liability, concerted action on the part of the defendants shifts the burden of proof to them. In order to evade liability, any defendant must prove that its actions were not connected to the plaintiff's injury.
In Sindell the defendants were charged with having (a) failed to test DES adequately, (b) not provided sufficient warnings, (c) relied upon the tests performed by one another, and (d) taken advantage of one another's promotion and marketing techniques. The court maintained that these allegations did not amount to a charge of tacit understanding or a common plan. Further, it could not be established either that each defendant knew the other's conduct was harmful to the plaintiff or that defendants had helped or encouraged one another with regard to inadequate testing and warning.
Enterprise Liability Experts who disagree with the extension of traditional theories of joint tort liability to allow for industry-wide liability have proposed that courts adopt the enterprise liability doctrine [Sheiner 1978; Podgers 1980 , Klemme 1976 ]. This approach would modify alternative liability in that a plaintiff would have to prove a "high probability" that the injury resulted from unjust behavior by one of the defendants. As described in one often-cited source, the specific elements of enterprise liability would be [Sheiner 1978 , p. 995]:
1. Plaintiff is not at fault for his inability to identify the causative agent and such liability is due to the nature of the defendant's conduct. 2. A generically similar defective product was manufactured by all the defendants. 3. Plaintiff's injury was caused by this product defect. 4. The defendant owed a duty to the class of which plaintiff was a member. 5. There is clear and convincing evidence that plaintiff's injury was caused by the product of some one of the defendants. For example, the joined defendants accounted for a high percentage of such defective products on the market at the time of the plaintiff's injury. 6. There existed an insufficient, industry-wide standard of safety as to the manufacture of this product. 7. All defendants were tortfeasors satisfying the requirements of whichever cause of action is proposed: strict liability, negligence, or warranty.
Defendants unable to prove that their products could not have caused the injury would pay damages according to their market shares [Sheiner 1978 , p. 994]. The justification for this enterprise liability basis for industry-wide liability rests upon the following policy argument [Sheiner 1978 , pp.
1002-4]:
Where an entire industry, engaged in a predictably dangerous enterprise and following similar safety practices, places an identically defective product in the stream of commerce, the industry rather than the individual manufacturer should be the focal point for liability because it can best allocate risks, distribute costs, and take preventive measures.
In Hall v. DuPont [1972] , six explosives manufacturers and their trade association were held liable for injuries resulting from blasting cap accidents. The court said that where individual manufacturers could not be identified, the existence of industry-wide standards or practices could support a finding of joint control of the risk, thereby shifting to each defendant the burden of proving its product could not have injured the plaintiffs. The question of whose blasting caps caused the harm became secondary to the court's finding that defendants engaged in joint control of the risk. So in situations where a plaintiff cannot identify which defendant manufactured the harmful product and each defendant is equally unable to prove that its product did not cause the injury, liability will follow. By noting these requirements, we wish to emphasize their special applicability to industries composed of a small number of units. What would be fair and feasible with regard to an industry of five to ten producers might be manifestly unreasonable if applied to a decentralized industry composed of thousands of small producers.
The Sindell court, using Hall for guidance, declined to apply enterprise liability to the DES situation for three reasons. If a plaintiff can establish the above elements, each defendant must then try to show that it could not have been the source of the harmful product. Since shifting this burden to defendants is tantamount to determining whether plaintiffs or defendants will most probably prevail, the court has apparently decided that the costs of DES injuries should be shared by those surviving DES producers whom plaintiffs can bring before a California court. The court relied on the Summers rationale that, as between an innocent plaintiff and negligent defendants, the latter should bear the cost of injury [Brahn 1980 ]. Additional policy-based reasons offered for the Sindell decision included the belief that defendants are better able to bear the cost of injury and that manufacturers are in the best position to guard against defects and to provide warnings; therefore, holding them liable for not adequately performing those tasks provides an incentive for product safety [Burch 1982 New Product Development The extension of liability for injuries which surface a generation after product use and for which causation need not be proven greatly increases the financial risk of introducing new products. One likely response to this situation will be more elaborate and expensive testing procedures prior to marketing such products. Further, duplicate testing of new products by pharmaceutical manufacturers is likely to occur to avoid the possibility of "jointly controlling the risk."
An additional implication is the inevitable rise in product liability insurance rates. Indeed, given the uncertainties involved in predicting risks and expected losses for this sort of liability, the risk may become unratable. The relatively underdeveloped state-of-the-art of generational testing of food and drug products further exacerbates the insurance problem.
The net effect of these cost-raising factors will be the tendency of the pharmaceutical industry to slow product development, perhaps even abandoning controversial products because of the risks involved. But the potential impact of market share liability extends well beyond the pharmaceutical industry. Consider the possibility of applying this doctrine to other widely-used chemicals, such as asbestos. Asbestosis and similar respiratory diseases including lung cancer become apparent ten or more years after the initial exposure to the substance [Insurance v. Forty-Eight 1980]. Just as with DES, the injured person will probably be unable to identify the particular manufacturer who produced the offending product. Or, as is more likely to occur, the worker may have been exposed to asbestos supplied by several companies.
Should the market share approach be extended to these asbestos-related injuries, substantial exposure on the part of the asbestos manufacturers would result. Over 3,000 different products contain asbestos, ranging from consumer items such as toothbrushes and hair dryers to industrial goods such as asphalt and concrete water pipes. An estimated eight to eleven million workers have been exposed to asbestos since World War II began [Mansfield 1980 Fewer, larger manufacturer-distributor combinations will be better able to withstand the financial impact of intra-industry joint liability lawsuits. The economies of such large-scale operations may even allow the participating firms to self-insure should intra-industry risks become unratable. Smaller firms unable to withstand the financial impact of such a suit will be either forced out of business or compelled to become members of substantially larger distribution channels.
Current problems experienced by a channel member in seeking indemnification from other members will also lead to increased channel integration. Eaton, the manufacturer in Wetzel v. Eaton [1973] , an alternative liability case, experienced difficulty in identifying which of two component parts suppliers had manufactured the part which had failed, causing Wetzel's injuries. Intra-industry joint liability theories of recovery are usually invoked when plaintiffs have no way of identifying the specific defendant whose product caused the injuries. But All of the issues mentioned seem to point to the need to balance the injured parties' rights to recover damages against the defendants' concerns about maintaining the extent of liability within reasonable bounds. Modern technology has brought about the production and marketing of increasingly sophisticated products which can cause injuries via complex, unprecedented processes that may leave the injured party unable to identify the specific cause of the harm. As a matter of social policy, the law can allow those injuries to be borne by the parties which incur them or it can allow for some form of compensation by fashioning contemporary rules for recovery [Dworkin and Zollers 1982] . Since "the market is the ultimate laboratory, and the consumer is the ultimate test subject" [Wilson 1980, p. 757 ], the latter option seems much more acceptable.
